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Abstract— Most of previous research work in key man-
agement can only resist passive attacks, such as dropping
the certificate request, and are vulnerable under active
attacks, such as returning a fake reply to the node requesting
the certification service. In this paper, we propose two
algorithms to address both security and efficiency issues
of certification services in ad hoc networks. Both of the
algorithms can resist active attacks. In addition, simulation
results show that, compared to the previous works, our
second algorithm is not only much faster in a friendly
environment, but it also works well in a hostile environment
in which existing schemes work poorly. Furthermore, the
process of generating partial certificates in our second
algorithm is extremely fast. Such advantage is critical in ad
hoc networks where by nature the less help a node requests
from its neighbors, the higher is the chance of obtaining
the help. Consequently, using our second algorithm, a node
can easily find enough neighboring nodes which provide the
certification service.
I. Introduction
Among all the security issues in ad hoc networks,
key management is the most crucial one, because it is
the essential assumption of many other security services.
For instance, many secure routing protocols, such as
ARAN [1] and SRP [2], assume that a pair of private
and public keys and a certificate signed by a Trusted
Third Party (TTP) have been assigned to nodes. One core
problem of key management in ad hoc networks is how to
provide certification services securely. Most of previous
research work mainly focused on passive attacks, such
as dropping the certificate request, and are inefficient
under cases that malicious nodes launch active attacks,
such as returning a fake reply to the node requesting the
certification service. However, active attacks may result in
great risks, especially in the military field. Due to the poor
physical security in ad hoc networks, adversaries may
take over some nodes in the network. By launching active
attacks, adversaries can disable the certification service of
the whole network without being caught, with only a very
small portion of nodes.
To overcome these challenges, we propose two algo-
rithms based on threshold cryptography and Verifiable
Secret Sharing (VSS) to address both security and effi-
ciency issues of certification services in ad hoc networks.
Both of the two algorithms can resist active attacks
on certification services in ad hoc networks. Simulation
results show that, compared to the previous works [3],
[4], our second algorithm is not only much faster in a
friendly environment, but it also works well in a hostile
environment in which existing schemes work poorly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
studies the related work in the literature. After intro-
ducing some cryptographical primitives in Section III,
in Section IV, we present the system model of our
algorithms. Certification services and secret share updates
are presented in Section V and Section VI, respectively.
Simulation results on the security and efficiency of our
scheme are given in Section VII. In Section VIII, we draw
the conclusions.
II. Related Work
In [5], Zhou and Haas focused on how to establish a
secure key management service in an ad hoc networking
environment. They proposed to use threshold cryptogra-
phy [6], [7] to distribute trust among a set of servers. The
focus of their work is to maximize the security of the
shared secret in the presence of possible compromises
of the secret share holders. It assumes a small group of
servers with rich connectivity. Therefore, it is not suitable
for purely ad hoc environments.
In [3], [4], Kong et al. also took advantage of threshold
secret sharing to distribute the functions of the Certificate
Authority (CA) but extended it to normal nodes. In other
words, each node holds a secret share and multiple nodes
in a local neighborhood jointly provide complete services.
It minimizes the effort and complexity for mobile clients
to locate and contact the service providers. One major
weakness of this scheme is that, due to the inability
of distinguishing adversaries who provide invalid partial
certificates from honest nodes, both of their algorithms
for certification renewals are vulnerable to active attacks,
such as sending invalid partial certificates which result in
the failure of renewing or assigning a certificate. In [8],
Lehane et al. presented a similar scheme based on shared
RSA key generation, and thus share the pros and cons of
[3], [4]. In addition, according to their empirical results,
the efficiency of their protocol is not good.
One recent work by Narasimha et. al. [9] pointed out
that Kong’s algorithm [3], [4] is vulnerable to active
attacks, and proposed a Threshold DSA signature scheme.
Their scheme is in fact similar to our first algorithm, in the
sense that both of them are standard VSS processes based
on Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), and thus are more
costly, compared to our second algorithm. In addition,
the standard VSS process requires almost twice as many
as neighbors involved in the certification service within
one round. More specifically, given that, there are k − 1
adversaries in the network, the Threshold DSA signature
scheme [9] requires helps from 2k−1 neighbors, while our
second algorithm needs helps from k neighbors instead.
Both [5] and [3], [4] require a trusted authority, though
the latter needs the authority only at the start-up phase.
In [10], a more extreme case, where there is no central
authority at all, was considered. Each user is her own au-
thority domain and issues public-key certificates to other
users. When user u wants to verify user v, they merge
their local certificate repositories and find an appropriate
certificate chain from u to v in the merged repository. This
method has a few weaknesses. Firstly, the initialization
phase (i.e. build the local certificate repository) is rela-
tively expensive. In addition, to achieve better assurance
about the user-key binding, authentication metrics are
used. However, how to find the most appropriate metric
for ad hoc networks remains an open issue. Even if such
a metric exists, the dynamic property1 of ad hoc networks
results in very high computation costs in reconstructing
local certificate repositories of all the nodes. Furthermore,
the metric’s confidence in someone’s honesty can be
easily cheated, as any user can create an arbitrary number
of public keys and issue many false certificates.
1The dynamic property here does not mean the join/drop operations
of nodes but revocations of certificates due to compromises or other
reasons.
III. Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we briefly describe various crypto-
graphic techniques underlying our approach.
A. Secret Sharing
The first secret sharing scheme was proposed by
Shamir in 1979 [11]. This scheme is also called a (n, k)-
threshold scheme, since it has the following properties:
(1) any k or more users can reconstruct the secret from
their shares; (2) for k− 1 or fewer users, it is impossible
to reconstruct the secret. The integer k is called the
threshold.
B. Proactive Security
A proactive threshold cryptography scheme [12]–[14]
uses share refreshing, which enables users to compute new
shares from old ones in collaboration without disclosing
the service private key, i.e. the shared secret, to any
user. The new shares constitute a new (n, k) sharing of
the service private key. After refreshing, users remove
the old shares and only keep the new ones. Because
the new shares are independent of the old ones, the
adversary cannot combine old shares with new shares to
recover the private key of the service. Thus, the adversary
is challenged to compromise k users between periodic
refreshings.
C. Verifiable Secret Sharing Schemes
There are two weaknesses in the Shamir secret sharing
scheme: (1)If the dealer distributes erroneous subshares
to some or all the users, how can users verify whether
the subshares received are correct? (2)During the share
recovery process, if some compromised users provide
false subshares, how can other users detect them?
Share refreshing must tolerate missing subshares and
erroneous subshares from compromised users. A compro-
mised user may not send any subshares. However, as long
as correct users agree on the set of subshares to use, they
can generate new shares using only subshares generated
from k users in a (n, k) secret sharing scheme. To detect
incorrect subshares, a few VSS schemes were proposed
in [12], [15]. A VSS scheme generates extra public
information for each (sub)share using a one-way function.
The public information can testify the correctness of the
corresponding (sub)shares without disclosing them.
IV. System Model
Before providing the certification service, the secret
key of the whole ad hoc network has been securely shared
by all the members in the network using a (n, k) secret
sharing scheme. Namely, only k or more nodes can jointly
recover the secret key. And besides a share of the secret
key, each node has a personal PKI key pair. The key pair
can be generated by either a TTP or even the node itself.
A. Notation and Assumptions
In the rest of this paper, we use the following notations:
• [SK,PK]: the secret and public key pair of the
whole ad hoc network. PK is known by all the
nodes.
• SKi: a secret share of SK , which is held by node
“i”.
• [ski, pki]: the personal secret and public key pair
of node “i”.
• IDi: the identifier of node “i”.
• certi: a statement consisting of the association
between node i and its public key and the expired
time.
• CERTi: the certificate of node “i”. It is a signature
on the statement certi using SK .
We make the following assumptions in this paper:
1) Each node i has a personal PKI key pair [pki, ski].
2) Given the public key of any node, it is computa-
tionally infeasible to obtain the corresponding secret
key.
3) Between any two consecutive secret share updates,
the number of adversaries that hold secret shares
originating from SK is less than k. Adversaries may
still stay in the network, or have already left it.
B. Types of Attacks on Certification Services
In this paper, we consider two types of possible attacks
on certification services in ad hoc networks: passive
attacks and active attacks. In passive attacks, adversaries
simply drop and refuse to forward other nodes’ requests
of assigning or renewing certificates. In active attacks,
in contrast, adversaries may return a fake reply (namely,
an invalid partial certificate) to the node requesting certi-
fication services. In [3], [4], Kong et al. proposed two
algorithms to prevent passive attacks. However, their
algorithms are vulnerable to active attacks. Specifically,
if any partial certificate returned to the requesting node is
invalid, although the requesting node can detect that the
combined certificate is invalid, it cannot figure out which
partial certificates are invalid. Consequently, the current
process fails, and all the computation done are wasted.
The node has to restart the process by selecting k partial
certificates again. Simulation results in Section VII shows
that the success rate of completing the certification service
in their algorithms drops very fast when the threshold of
the network increases. Accordingly, the number of rounds
for completing the certification service increase rapidly
when the threshold of the network increases. Here, one
round is defined to be the whole procedure that begins
from a node requesting to be assigned a new certificate
or renew its certificate to the combination and validation
process of certificates assigned or renewed.
V. Certificate Initialization and Renewal
There are two ways to issue a new certificate or renew
a certificate. A node may be issued an initial certificate
by an online or offline TA, after the authority verifies the
authenticity through external means (e.g., in-person ID).
However, it is both costly for the TA to maintain certifi-
cates of all the nodes and is inconvenient for new nodes
to request their certificates from the TA. An alternative
approach is to use any coalition of k networking nodes
to issue an initial certificate via collaborative admission
control for this new node.
In [3], [4], Kong et al. employed the RSA scheme to
provide the certification services. In our algorithms, we
design them based on the difficulty of DLP. Variants of the
Schnorr signature scheme [16] and the signature scheme
proposed by Park and Kurosawa [17] are designed to
fulfill the task. Here we only show two algorithms based
on the Schnorr signature scheme. In the former, nodes i
selects a group of 2k−1 nodes, and these nodes cooperate
to assign node i a certificate. It requires only one round
to assign a certificate. In the latter, node i selects a group
of k nodes, and these nodes cooperate to assign node i
a certificate. It may need more than one round to assign
a certificate, when there are malicious nodes launching
active attacks.
The first algorithm has been proposed by Stinson
and Strobl [18], which is provably secure, i.e., one can
break this threshold signature iff one can break Schnorr’s
signature. The second algorithm is modified from [18]
by us, which is also provably secure. It is very efficient
but not fault-tolerant. These two algorithms, especially the
second one, are more efficient and secure than algorithms
proposed in [3], [4]. Firstly, their algorithms cannot handle
active attacks. It can only verify whether the combined
certificate is valid, but fails to find out the invalid partial
certificates. Consequently, as long as there is one fake
partial certificate among the k partial certificates chosen to
generate the certificate, all the work done by other honest
nodes are useless. Even worsely, adversaries can perform
the attack without being caught. To prevent such attack,
in our scheme nodes can verify each partial certificate
to detect those malicious nodes. Secondly, our algorithms
are based on DLP, which is faster than RSA on which
[3], [4] is based. Thirdly, the time for generating a partial
certificate in our second algorithm is 7 to 150 times
shorter than [3], [4]. Such advantage is critical in ad hoc
networks where by nature the less help a node requests
from its neighbors, the higher is the chance of obtaining
the help. Furthermore, their solution requires a k-bounded
offsetting to recover the real certificate, while we can
generate the real certificate directly.
A. Assigning certificates based on 2k − 1 nodes
In this algorithm, the VSS scheme proposed in [12]
is employed to find out adversaries who launch active
attacks. Since Pedersen’s VSS scheme [15] requires a
dealer, it is not suitable for ad hoc environments. Instead,
we follow the distributed way proposed in Stinson’s
scheme [18] to achieve verifiable secure sharing. This
algorithm requires cooperations from 2k− 1 nodes2, and
it ensures that the whole process of assigning a certificate
can be finished within one round, in spite of active attacks
launched by malicious nodes, since there are at most k−1
adversaries.
Let p and q be two large primes such that q divides
p − 1, and let Gq is the unique multiplicative subgroup
of Zp with order q. Let m be the statement claiming that
a new node i’s public key is pki, let h(·) be a one-way
hash function: {0, 1}∗ → Zq .
Firstly, node i chooses a group of 2k − 1 nodes from
its neighbors. Without loss of generality, let the group
be G = {1, · · · , 2k − 1}. Then node i broadcasts the
request m together with the IDs of the 2k−1 nodes among
the group G. To achieve VSS, we need to generate a
random shared secret denoted as r within group G. Details
is shown as follows.
For each node j ∈ G receiving the request and
deciding to serve the request, it chooses rj , r′j ∈ Zq at
random, and verifiably shares them among G acting as
the dealer according to Pedersen’s VSS scheme. Let the
sharing polynomials be fj(u) =
∑k−1
t=0 ajtu
t
, f ′j(u) =∑k−1
t=0 a
′
jtu
t
, where aj0 = rj , a′j0 = r′j . Let the public
commitments be Cjt = gajt · ha
′
jt (mod p) for t ∈
{0, · · · , k − 1}, where g and h are two generators of Gq
and no one knows logg h. Let H0 be the set of nodes
which are not detected to be cheating. Then the shared
secret r is defined as r =
∑
j∈H0
rj , and node j sets his
share of the secret as ej =
∑
t∈H0
ft(IDj) (mod q), and
the value e′j =
∑
t∈H0
f ′t(IDj) (mod q).
Next, each node j (∈ H0) broadcasts Ajk = gajt for
t ∈ {0, · · · , k−1}, and each node s in H0 can verify the
values broadcasted by other nodes in H0 by checking if
gfj(IDs) =
k−1∏
t=0
(Ajt)
IDts (mod p) (1)
If the check fails for an index j, node s complains against
node j by broadcasting the values fj(IDs), f ′j(IDs) that
satisfy
gfj(IDs) · hf
′
j(IDs) =
k−1∏
t=0
(Cjt)
IDs
t
(mod p) (2)
2On consideration of the dynamic property of ad hoc networks,
a slightly higher number of nodes may need to be involved in this
algorithm.
but do not satisfy Eq. (1). For node i which received
at least one valid complaint, other nodes run the recon-
struction phase of Pedersen’s VSS scheme to compute rj ,
fj(·), Ajt for t = 0, · · · , k− 1. Therefore, all the players
in H0 set Xj = grj .
After performing these steps, the following equations
hold:
X =
∏
j∈H0
Xj = g
r(mod p)
f(u) = r + a1u+ · · ·+ ak−1u
k−1
where at =
∑
j∈H0
ajt, for t ∈ 1, · · · , k − 1, and f(j) =
ej (mod q) for j ∈ H0.
In [19], the above scheme is proved to be robust under
the assumption that k ≤ n2 . In ad hoc networks, such
assumption is reasonable, since normally the threshold is
set to be much less than the number of of nodes in the
whole network.
Then for each node j ∈ H0, reveals its partial certifi-
cate:
γj = ej + h(m||X) · SKj (mod q),
and γj can be verified by:
gγj = X ·
k−1∏
t=1
C
IDj
t
t · PK
h(m||X)
j
where Ct = gat , for all j ∈ H0.
Let H1 denote the set of nodes not detected to be
cheating in the above step. After verifying the partial
certificates, node i selects an arbitrary subset H2 ⊆ H1
with |H2| = k. Without loss of generality, we denote
H2 = {1, · · · , k}, and compute:
σ =
∑
j∈H2
γjl
′
j(0) (mod q)
where l′j(0) =
∏k
r 6=j, j∈H2
IDr
IDr−IDj
(mod q). Then node
i’s signature for m (i.e. CERTi) is the pair (X , σ). Since
σ = e + h(m||X)SK (mod q), other nodes can verify
the certificate by:
gσ = X · PKh(m||X) (mod p)
B. Assigning certificates based on k nodes
Although the algorithm presented Section V-A can
complete the certification service within one round, the
computation overhead for achieving VSS is heavy for
nodes in ad hoc networks. To solve this problem, in
this section we propose another algorithm which requires
lightweight computation. This algorithm needs coopera-
tions from only k nodes, but it may take more than one
round to assign a certificate, when malicious nodes are
launching active attacks. Although this algorithm is not
fault-tolerant, we can distinguish honest and malicious
nodes, and those honest nodes are selected directly as
members of group G of the next round. Simulation results
show that more than 96% of certification renewals can be
finished within two rounds, even if malicious nodes launch
active attacks. It is much higher than algorithms proposed
in [3], [4], which declines very fast when the threshold
increases.
Let p and q be two large primes such that q divides
p− 1, let Gq is the unique multiplicative subgroup of Zp
with order q, and let g be a generator of Gq . Let m be
the statement claiming that a new node i’s public key is
pki, let h(·) be a one-way hash function: {0, 1}∗ → Zq .
Details of the algorithm for generating a threshold
Schnorr signature are shown as follows. Firstly, node i
chooses a group of k nodes from its neighbors. Without
loss of generality, let the group be G = {1, · · · , k}. Then
node i broadcasts the request m together with the IDs of
the k nodes in group G.
Once a node j ∈ G receives the request and decides
to serve the request, it first chooses a random integer
ej ∈ Zq and broadcasts xj = gej (mod p) and PKj =
gSKj (mod p) within the group G. Then node j calculates
its partial certificate γj that is specific to group G
γj = ej + h(m||X) · SKj · lj(0) (mod q) ,
where lj(0) =
∏k
r=1,r 6=j
IDr
IDr−IDj
(mod q) and X =
∏k
j=1 xj (mod p), and returns it to node i. Node i can
verify the partial certificate as follow:
gγj = xj · PK
h(m||X)lj(0)
j (mod p) (3)
If the k partial certificates are valid, node i calculates
σ =
∑k
j=1 γj , and its signature for m (i.e. CERTi) is
the pair (X , σ). Other nodes and node i can verify the
certificate by:
gσ = X · PKh(m||X) (mod p) (4)
In practice, node i can first verify (X , σ) using
Eq. (4). If it is valid, the task is completed. Otherwise,
node i then verifies the partial certificates using Eq. (3).
Those adversaries providing invalid partial certificates are
detected at this stage.
VI. Scalable Share Updates
Although adversaries are not able to compromise k or
more nodes at the same time, the number of nodes com-
promised may increase gradually. Therefore, to prevent
the secret key of the network from being disclosed, we
need to update the shares of the secret key periodically.
To ensure the security of share updates, we employ proac-
tive secret sharing schemes [12]–[14], [20] to adapt the
configuration of the secret sharing to variations in highly
dynamic environments, such as ad hoc networks. The
proactive threshold cryptography scheme enables nodes
in the network to compute new shares from old ones
in collaboration without disclosing SK . It relies on the
homomorphic property.
We notice that it is unnecessary to require all the nodes
involved in the share refreshing process. Instead, the task
can be done by only k nodes, since we assume that,
between any two consecutive secret share updates, the
number of adversaries which hold secret shares originat-
ing from the same secret key is less than k. To detect
those incorrect subshares, VSS scheme [18] is employed.
Details are shown as follows. To renew the secret
shares of all the n nodes, firstly, k nodes are chosen from
the network. Without lose of generality, we denote them
as (ID1, · · · , IDk). Then each of the k nodes, denoted
as node i, randomly generates a (n, k) sharing of 0,
denoted as (SKi1, SKi2, · · · , SKin). After receiving all
the subshares generated by the k nodes, each node in
the network, denoted as node j, can compute a new share
from them and its old share (SK ′j = SKj+
∑k
i=1 SKij).
The new shares constitute a new (n, k) sharing of the
service secret key. After refreshing, nodes remove the
old shares and use the new ones to generate partial
signatures. Because the new shares are independent of
the old ones, the adversary cannot combine old shares
with new shares to recover the secret key of the service.
Thus, the adversary is challenged to compromise k nodes
between periodic refreshing.
VII. Simulations on Security and Efficiency
Current on-demand routing protocols, such as AODV
[21] and OLSR [22], handle well when the size of an ad
hoc network is around 100 to 250 nodes. Thus, we set
the network size within this range in our simulation. Let
pn be the probability of a node being compromised, pr
be the probability of SK being compromised, and n be
the size of the network. Table I shows the settings on the
threshold under different conditions. For example, when
pn is not less than 0.01, to ensure pr lower than 10−4,
the threshold should be set to at least 7 and 11 for an ad
hoc network with 100 and 250 nodes, respectively.
TABLE I
SETTINGS ON THE THRESHOLD OF A REGION
n = 100 n=250
pn pr < 10
−4 pr < 10
−5 pr < 10
−4 pr < 10
−5
0.01 7 8 11 13
0.05 16 17 28 30
0.1 24 26 45 48
A. Computational Costs of Certification Services
We measure and compare the performance of Kong’s
algorithm and our second algorithm on two Windows
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Fig. 1. Total Time for Generating or Renewing A Certificate in Our
Second Algorithm
2000 machines. One is a Pentium IV 2.2G desktop, and
the other is a Pentium III 800 laptop. Due to the limited
space, we only show the implementation results on the
Pentium III 800 laptop. Both of algorithms are imple-
mented in Java. We run the experiments under different
settings, e.g. different key lengths, thresholds, and region
sizes. For each setting, we run the two algorithms for 20
times respectively and then calculate the average values.
As shown in Figure 1, the total time for generating or
renewing a certificate in our second algorithm varies from
20 to 250 milliseconds in the experiments, depending
on the setting on the key length, threshold, and region
size. In particular, when the key length is 1024 bits, it
takes our second algorithm around 40 to 70 milliseconds
to generate or renew a certificate. We also find that,
in our second algorithm, the process that a neighbor
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Fig. 2. Time for Generating A Partial Certificate in Our Second
Algorithm
generates a partial certificate for the new node is very
fast. As shown in Figure 2, such process takes less
than 32 milliseconds under all the settings tested in the
experiments. In particular, when the key length is 1024
bits, it takes less than 9 milliseconds to generate a partial
certificate.
To compare with previous work [3], [4], [23], in
Figure 3 and Figure 4, we show the ratio of the total
time for generating or renewing a certificate in Kong’s
algorithm to that of our second algorithm and the ratio
of the time for generating a partial certificate in Kong’s
algorithm to that of our second algorithm, respectively. As
shown in Figure 3, our second algorithm is more efficient,
when we consider the total time for assigning a new
certificate. For instance, when the key length is 1024 bits,
our second algorithm is around six to eight times faster
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Fig. 4. Ratio of Time for Generating A Partial Certificate in Kong
Algorithm to That of Our Second Algorithm
than Kong’s algorithm. As to the process of generating
a partial certificate, the efficiency is greatly improved in
our second algorithm. For example, when the key length is
1024 bits, our second algorithm is around 20 to 80 times
faster. Consequently, using our second algorithm, a node
can easily find enough neighboring nodes to provide the
certification service, since very little effort is involved.
From empirical results, we notice that the performance
of our algorithm is tightly related to the key length and
the threshold. The larger the key length is, the more time
we need to complete the certification service. However,
compared to Kong et al.’s scheme, our second scheme is
less sensitive to this parameter, and thus is more efficient.
Similarly, the larger the threshold is, the more time we
need to complete the certification service.
B. Certification Services Under Active Attacks
To compare the efficiency of certification services
under active attacks, we use the success rate of certifica-
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Fig. 5. Success Rate of Certification Renewals in 2 Rounds
tion renewals within two rounds and the average rounds
of retries before successfully assigning or renewing a
certificate as the evaluation metrics.
We run the simulations in a 600m X 600m network
with 100 or 250 nodes, and the speed of nodes ranges
from 1 m/s to 20 m/s. We apply the random way-point
model to emulate node mobility pattern.
As shown in Figure 5, the success rate of [3], [4]
declines very quickly when the threshold increases. For
example, for a network with size 100 and pn is 0.01, if
the threshold is set to be 5, the success rate is 83.41%.
However, if the threshold increases to 10, the success rate
drops to 40.59%.
Figure 6 show the average retries of certification
renewals in [3], [4] and our scheme. In the former,
the number of average retries is very sensitive to the
increment of the threshold. In contrast, in our scheme, the
average number of retries is very stable and only around
2.
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VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed two algorithms based on
threshold cryptography and VSS to address both security
and efficiency issues of certification services in ad hoc
networks. Both of the two algorithms can resist active at-
tacks. In addition, simulation results show that, compared
to the previous works, our second algorithm is not only
much faster in a friendly environment, but it also works
well in a hostile environment in which existing schemes
work poorly. Besides that, using our second algorithm,
a node can easily find enough neighboring nodes which
provide the certification service.
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